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ENFORCEMENT IN KIND: REEXAMINING
THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE IN
ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES
William Hochul III*
INTRODUCTION
In early 1995, a fight broke out between Cesar Herante, Guillermo Escobedo, and Justin Younie in Hawarden, Iowa. Younie was
killed following a series of stab wounds from Herante and Escobedo.1
Younie’s death “in the small Iowa town in which he was born and
raised”2 sparked national outrage because his killers were unauthorized aliens. Federal lawmakers—fearing that state and local governments were powerless to stop violent aliens—quickly created a
mechanism for local agencies to “join the fight against illegal
immigration.”3
Fifteen years later, Robert Krentz was murdered near his home
on the Arizona-Mexico border.4 His death came amidst growing discontent with the federal government’s ability and eagerness to curtail
movement across the border, which was perceived as both an economic and security threat to American citizens.5 Arizona responded
by enacting legislation that empowered state and local officers to
enforce immigration law of their own accord.6 A critical component
* Candidate for J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2013; B.A. Political Science, State
University of New York at Geneseo, 2009. Special thanks to Professor Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr. for his guidance and advice.
1 See State v. Escobedo, 573 N.W.2d 271, 274–75 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
2 Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2202 Before the
Committee of the Whole, 142 CONG. REC. H2476 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) [hereinafter
Hearing on H.R. 2202] (statement of Rep. Latham) (discussing his proposed
amendment).
3 Id. at H2477.
4 See Randal C. Archibold, Ranchers Alarmed by Killing Near Border, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2010, at A9.
5 See Daniel B. Wood, Robert Krentz Killing Stokes Fears of Rampant Illegal Immigration, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 31, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/2010/0331/Robert-Krentz-killing-stokes-fears-of-rampant-illegal-immigration.
6 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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of the law—the “Papers, Please” provision—required state and local
officers to perform immigration checks during any stops or detentions
that raise reasonable suspicion of unauthorized presence in the
United States.7 Shortly after the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Arizona
law was preempted by federal immigration law,8 Alabama passed an
identical provision that was eventually upheld by the Eleventh
Circuit.9
This Note uses Arizona v. United States10 as a platform to reexamine preemption jurisprudence and sets forth a comprehensive framework for analyzing federal-state conflicts. Part I establishes the
foundation of federal preemption in immigration law and evaluates
the role and operation of competing preemption principles. Part II
critiques United States v. Arizona and United States v. Alabama and sets
the stage for the case before the Court. Part III applies the framework set forth in this Note to Arizona v. United States and offers a resolution to the federal-state conflict presented to the Court. While the
Arizona and Alabama Papers, Please provisions further Congress’s
overarching goal of strengthening immigration enforcement, the process they implement undermines Congress’s ability to account for the
collateral implications of empowering thousands of local officers to
enforce federal immigration law. By vesting affirmative duties in state
and local officers that subvert the top-down enforcement mechanism
created by Congress, the Arizona and Alabama laws conflict with, and
are therefore preempted by, federal law.
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION

IN

IMMIGRATION LAW

Recent challenges to local and state immigration regulations are
rooted in the preemption doctrine.11 This Part establishes the foundation of federal preemption and examines its application in the
7 Id.
8 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 354 (9th Cir. 2011).
9 See infra Part II.B.2.
10 No. 11-182 (2012).
11 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011)
(“[Plaintiffs] argued that the Arizona [immigrant employment] law[ ] . . . [was] both
expressly and impliedly preempted by federal immigration law . . . .”); United States v.
Alabama, 443 F. App’x 411 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[The United States argues the Alabama
immigration law is] preempted under the Supremacy Clause and by federal law
. . . .”); Arizona, 641 F.3d at 344 (“[T]he United States . . . alleg[es] that [Arizona’s
immigration law] violated the Supremacy Clause on the grounds that it was preempted . . . .”); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d
835, 851 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (“Plaintiffs’ first substantive challenge . . . is rooted in the
Supremacy Clause and federal preemption.”).
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sphere of immigration law. The principles set forth in this Part will
guide the forthcoming analysis of Arizona v. United States.
A. The Framework of Federal Preemption
The constitutional foundation for the preemption doctrine lies in
the Supremacy Clause, which dictates “[t]his Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”12 As a result, “any state
law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, must yield if
it interferes with or is contrary to [valid] federal law . . . .”13 In sum,
“if a federal statute establishes a rule, and if the Constitution grants
Congress the power to establish that rule, then the rule preempts
whatever state law it contradicts.”14
Thus, the Supremacy Clause establishes a rule of federal priority
when a court must choose between applying state or federal laws.15
The challenge for the court is to draw the line between compatibility
and conflict.16 The court’s “ultimate task” in a preemption case is to
determine whether a state or local ordinance is consistent with the
“structure and purpose” of a federal statute.17
As a general matter, the court should proceed by first establishing
that the federal law in question is valid. The power to preempt is
“pendant on some enumerated power under [the Constitution,]” so
the court must determine whether Congress has acted within the
scope of its enumerated powers, thereby creating a valid law that
could preempt the state law at issue.18 Should the court determine
12 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 89 (1992). See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824) (“[T]hough enacted in the execution of
acknowledged State powers, [laws that] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of
Congress . . . must yield to [federal law].”).
14 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 264 (2000).
15 See id. at 250.
16 Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 1743, 1753 (1992) (“It is a hallmark of the ‘actual’ conflict cases that the interesting question . . . is likely to begin with the question whether there is a conflict or not
. . . because once ‘actual’ conflict is ascertained, the Supremacy Clause potentially
resolves the conflict in favor of primary governance by the nation.” (footnote
omitted)).
17 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
18 Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2091 (2000)
(“Preemption is not a substantive power of Congress, but rather a method of regulation in furtherance of some other substantive Congressional authority.”).
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the federal law is valid, the court may proceed to determine whether
and to what extent the statute conflicts with state law.19
The court’s conflict analysis begins with the intended scope and
application of the federal statute and is guided by two principles.20
First, the “‘purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every
pre-emption case.’”21 For this reason, extratextual sources must be
examined even where language does not directly conflict.22 Second,
preemption analysis is guided by the “assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded . . . unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”23
19 See id., at 2092 (“When Congress has legislated consistent with its limited, enumerated powers, the question ceases to be one about the vertical distribution of powers between federal and state governments . . . . Rather, . . . the task for the Court is to
discern what Congress has legislated and whether such legislation displaces concurrent state law—in short, the task of statutory construction.”). At times, the Court has
proceeded by beginning with the breadth of the federal statute and then analyzing its
constitutionality. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26–27 (1988)
(“[W]hen the federal law sought to be applied is a Congressional statute, the first and
chief question . . . is whether the statute is ‘sufficiently broad to control the Issue
before the Court.’ . . . [If so, the court] proceeds to inquire whether the statute represents a valid exercise of Congress’[s] authority under the Constitution.” (quoting
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–750 (1980))). This formulation
should not affect a case’s outcome and seems better suited to handle cases in which
the primary issue is Congressional authority. Often, as with Arizona v. United States,
the case turns on the breadth of the federal statute rather than its constitutionality.
In such instances, preemption analysis seems to proceed more efficiently by beginning briefly with constitutionality and moving to the breadth of the federal statute,
after which the court may determine the extent to which the state statute in question
conflicts with that breadth.
20 See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
21 Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
22 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (“Whether federal
law pre-empts a state law . . . is a question of Congressional intent.”); Dinh, supra note
18, at 2117 (“[I]t is consistent with traditional statutory analysis to resort to external
sources such as structure and purpose to resolve [textual deadlock].”). I recognize
that reference to extratextual materials has drawn extensive criticism from scholars
and some members of the Court. I will discuss this issue in greater depth in Part III,
but it is important to note that recent preemption analysis has relied on such extraneous sources. For acknowledgement and critique of its use, see Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 604
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The origins of this Court’s ‘purposes and objectives’ preemption jurisprudence in [Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)] and its broad
application in cases like [Geier v. Am. Honda Motor, Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000)]
illustrate that this brand of the Court’s pre-emption jurisprudence facilitates freewheeling, extra-textual, and broad evaluations of the ‘purposes and objectives’
embodied within federal law.”).
23 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565. The presumption against preemption “is rooted in the
concept of federalism[,]” and serves to keep the “power of pre-emption squarely in
the hands of Congress,” thereby protecting “state interests from undue infringe-
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Once the court has ascertained the intended scope, i.e., whether
the statute governs the conduct in question, and application, i.e. how
the statute operates in practice, it may determine whether a state statute conflicts with the federal law. To do so, the court must identify
how the state statute operates in practice. The Court has identified
two broad categories of preemption, express and implied. “In enacting a federal law, Congress may [expressly] provide for or limit the
scope of any intended preemption through the statutory text or the
law’s legislative history.”24 Congress has expressly preempted state
immigration law subject to its constitutional authority to legislate on
some immigration issues, including sanctioning the employment of
unauthorized aliens.25
Absent an express preemption clause, federal law may still preempt state law by implication.26 The breadth of implied preemption
is limited in fields traditionally occupied by state power, in which
case Congress’s intent or purpose to preempt state law must be
expressed or necessarily implied.27 In contrast, state statutes are

ment.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 907. See also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531,
546 (1994) (“[Federal law] can of course override by implication when the implication is unambiguous. But where the intent to override is doubtful, our federal system
demands deference to long-established traditions of state regulation.”); Hines, 312
U.S. at 80 (Stone, J., dissenting) (“[A]n exercise by the state of its police power, which
would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the
repugnance or conflict is so ‘direct and positive’ that the two acts cannot ‘be fairly
reconciled or consistently stand together.’ ”).
24 Robert S. Peck, A Separation-of-Powers Defense of the “Presumption Against Preemption”, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (2010).
25 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
26 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579 (2011) (“The Supremacy Clause,
on its face, makes federal law ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ even absent an express
statement by Congress.”).
27 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“Congress legislated
here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded . . .
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” (citations omitted)).
This presumption against preemption does not affect Congress’s authority to preempt state law by a valid exercise of federal power. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243, 272 (2006) (“Even though regulation of health and safety is ‘primarily, and
historically, a matter of local concern,’ there is no question that the Federal Government can set uniform national standards in these areas.” (internal citations omitted)).
For a discussion of the presumption for or against preemption based on historic presence in the field, see Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 850–52 (2008).
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afforded less leeway in spheres traditionally occupied by the federal
government.28
Federal law impliedly preempts state statutes in three occasionally
overlapping circumstances:29 when Congress has enacted such a comprehensive scheme as to occupy an entire field of law (field preemption),30 when a state law conflicts with federal law (conflict
preemption), and when a state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of a federal purpose (obstacle preemption).31 Field preemption may exist where a federal regulatory scheme touches an area
“in which the federal interest is so dominant” that it may be assumed
that Congress intended, or purposed, to preclude state action in that
area.32 Conflict preemption exists where compliance with both the
federal and the state or local statute is impossible.33 Obstacle preemption, sometimes referred to as a species of conflict preemption, exists
where the state or local statute stands as an obstacle to the attainment

28 See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (“Even when
Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field, pre-emption may occur to the
extent that state and federal law actually conflict.”).
29 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
30 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461
U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983) (“Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress’[s] intent
to supersede state law altogether may be found from a ‘scheme of federal regulation
. . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to
supplement it . . . .’ ” (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982))); see also Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Field
preemption [of state law] applies where ‘the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.’ ” (quoting Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985))).
31 PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2579 (“[T]he text of the [Supremacy] Clause—that
federal law shall be supreme, ‘any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding’—plainly contemplates conflict pre-emption by describing federal law as effectively repealing contrary state law.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (“Our primary function is to determine whether . . . [state] law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”).
32 Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 204 (internal citation omitted); see also Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. at 230 (finding that Congressional purpose to supersede historic state
powers may be inferred from a pervasive federal regulatory scheme or action in an
area in which there is a “dominant” federal interest).
33 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)
(“[F]ederal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into Congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility . . . .”).
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of a federal purpose or goal.34 When evaluating the implied effects of
a federal law, “pre-emption is not to be lightly presumed.”35 Nonetheless, “courts should not strain to find ways to reconcile federal law with
seemingly conflicting state law.”36
B. Federal Action and Preemption in Immigration Law
Matters of pure immigration law, i.e., regulations governing the
entry of foreign nationals,37 generally fall within the historic power of
the federal government.38 The Supreme Court has indicated that
Congress derives its immigration power from general sovereignty principles and the federal government’s authority to conduct foreign policy and commerce.39 Despite historic federal dominance in the
sphere of immigration, states recently began enacting statutes that
34 See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“[Preemption exists] where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))); Columbia Venture, LLC v. Dewberry & Davis, LLC, 604 F.3d
824, 830 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that obstacle preemption “occurs where state law
interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach its
goal” (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 103)).
35 Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987).
36 PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2580 (“[P]re-emption analysis should not involve
speculation about ways in which federal agency and third-party actions could potentially reconcile federal duties with conflicting state duties.”); see also Nelson, supra
note 14, at 255 (“[T]he Supremacy Clause told courts not to strain [a federal statute’s] meaning in order to harmonize it with state law.”).
37 Huntington, supra note 27, at 795.
38 Id. (“For more than a hundred years, immigration law . . . has been almost
exclusively federal with no, or only a limited, role for state and local governments.”);
see also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“[We have] long recognized the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within
our borders.”); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990) (“[In general] [t]he plenary power . . .
doctrine declares that Congress and the executive branch have broad and often
exclusive authority over immigration decisions.”). It has been argued, however, that
“[t]he text and structure of the Constitution allow for shared authority,” and a better
approach to preemption analysis would be to apply federalism balancing principles to
immigration law. See Huntington, supra note 27, at 792–93.
39 Huntington, supra note 27, at 812 (citing Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581
(1889) and Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) as the historical foundation for
federal authority over immigration). Huntington also notes that states are expressly
forbidden from engaging in certain activities that relate to foreign affairs. Id.

R
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regulate the lives of immigrants with increasing frequency.40 These
statutes, defended by state governments as public safety ordinances41—matters of traditional state police power—have created the
present conflict between historic state police powers and the federal
government’s dominance in the field of immigration. For the Court’s
preemption analysis, it is important to first establish whether these
state statutes qualify as traditional exercises of state power, thereby
creating a presumption that Congress does not intend to preempt the
statutes.42
Courts and commentators have attempted to distinguish between
pure immigration law, including laws that select immigrants, and laws
that regulate the lives of immigrants already living in a state.43 The
40 Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal
Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 397 (2011) (“Preemption
challenges to subfederal employer-sanctions laws were rare before 2006, at least in
part because state and local governments largely did not legislate in this area.”).
Employment restrictions, while outside the scope of the Note, are often central to
state local immigration legislation. Id. at 390 n.1. Professor Adam Cox also noted the
recent “explosion” of state and local immigration laws. Adam B. Cox, Immigration
Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 353 (2008). According to the
Migration Policy Institute (cited by Cox), more than 150 immigration-related measures were passed in 2007, up more than three-hundred percent from 2006. State and
Local Immigration Regulation, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., http://www.migrationinforma
tion.org/integration/regulation.cfm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
41 Since their passage, many commentators have argued that legislators were in
fact motivated by prejudice rather than good faith safety concerns and intended to
affect the lives and residency of unauthorized immigrants. For a scathing critique of
Arizona state legislators, see Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona
Became Ground Zero for the Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for
Latino Civil Rights in America, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“[A]nti-immigrant
fervor in Arizona reached a crescendo with the enactment of S.B. 1070, . . . the codification of a long-standing scheme designed to spur ‘attrition through enforcement
. . . .’ ”). Professor Campbell argues Arizona’s Papers, Please provision is a “form of
legitimized vigilantism designed to purge the State of Arizona . . . of all persons who
are or appear to be of Latino heritage, through racial profiling by state and local law
enforcement.” Id. at 2.
42 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
43 See Cox, supra note 40, at 345. While acknowledging this bifurcation is the
generally accepted approach to the federal-state power conflict, Professor Cox notes
this distinction may not withstand closer scrutiny. Id. at 360 (“Efforts to classify a
particular legal rule either as an immigrant-selecting rule or an immigrant-regulating
rule will inevitably fail. Every putative selection rule creates regulatory pressure . . .,
and every putative regulatory rule creates selection pressure . . . .”). The Court formerly recognized the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between rules that select
and rules that regulate immigrants, but has since embraced this distinction. See Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or
exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government. The assertion of an

R
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assumption is that while unauthorized to select immigrants for residency, states have an inherent power to police the interaction
between people and institutions within their borders and a legitimate
interest in doing so. Thus, state statutes that fall under the umbrella
of state regulation, though still affecting the lives of immigrants,
should be afforded greater latitude in the immigration sphere and
should not be per se preempted by federal law.44
To determine whether a specific state law is preempted by federal
immigration law, a court should start by determining the purpose and
scope of federal regulations. The “primary body”45 of federal immigration law is found in the Immigration and Nationality Act46 (INA),
which “establishe[s] a ‘comprehensive federal statutory scheme for
regulation of immigration and naturalization.’”47 The INA sets forth
the legal definition of “aliens”48 and generally governs the freedom
afforded to non-U.S. citizens when they attempt to “enter, visit, and
reside in [the United States].”49 Most importantly, the INA provides
the “sole and exclusive procedure” for admitting and removing noncitizens from the United States.50 In so doing, the INA dictates the
“treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.”51 Thus, the INA
expressly preempts state and local legislation touching “pure” immigration—i.e., the procedures for admitting and removing aliens—and
vests substantial discretion in the federal government in carrying out
its plenary power in the field.52 The INA also governs the enforceauthority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully
admitted to the State would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them
entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.”
(internal citation omitted)).
44 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (“[T]he Court has never held that
every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by [federal power], whether latent or exercised.”);
see also Huntington, supra note 27, at 799 (discussing the resurgence of state and local
immigration regulation).
45 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 196 (3d. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2958 (2011) (reversing on other grounds).
46 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1357 (2006).
47 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (quoting De
Canas, 424 U.S. at 353).
48 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
49 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 196.
50 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3).
51 De Canas, 424 U.S. at 359.
52 Section 1229b of the INA authorizes the Attorney General to cancel the
removal of unauthorized aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. See also Reno v. Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999) (noting the authority of the
Immigration and Nationalization Services (now administered by the Department of
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ment of federal immigration law by empowering immigration officers
and employees.53
The Immigration Reform and Control Act54 (IRCA) supplements
the federal regulatory scheme created by the INA by criminalizing the
unauthorized employment of aliens. Though local and state employment restrictions are generally outside the scope of this Note, the
IRCA indicates Congress’s desire to make “combating the employment of illegal aliens central to the ‘[p]olicy of immigration law.’”55
In so doing, Congress expressly preempted state and local statutes
that criminalize the employment of unauthorized aliens.56 The IRCA
also demonstrates Congress’s concern for discrimination in the
enforcement of immigration law.57 The IRCA sets forth harsh penalties (equivalent to those for unlawfully employing unauthorized
aliens)58 for employers who discriminate based on national origin or
citizenship status.59 The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act60 (IIRIRA) constitutes the final component of fedHomeland Security) to selectively enforce federal immigration law based on policy
and equitable considerations); Lozano, 630 F.3d at 197–98 (“[W]hile any alien who is
in the United States unlawfully faces the prospect of removal proceedings being initiated against her/him, whether s/he will actually be ordered removed is never a certainty until all legal proceedings have concluded.”).
53 Most importantly, the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act governs the enforcement of federal immigration law. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 provides:
(a) Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant—
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his
right to be or to remain in the United States;
(2) to arrest any alien . . . ., if he has reason to believe that the alien so
arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation
[made in pursuance of law regulating the admission, exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens] . . . but the alien arrested shall be taken
without unnecessary delay for examination before an officer of the Service having authority to examine aliens as to their right to enter or
remain in the United States.
54 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a–1324b.
55 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (internal citation omitted).
56 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (“The provisions of this section preempt any State or
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions . . . upon those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens.”).
57 Lozano , 630 F.3d at 199 (“Because of its concern that prohibiting the employment of unauthorized aliens might result in employment discrimination . . . Congress
included significant anti-discrimination protections in IRCA.”).
58 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A), with 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B).
59 8 U.S.C. § 1324b.
60 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
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eral immigration law. Central to the analysis of this Note, IIRIRA,
through section 1357(g), dictates the conditions under which state
and local officials may take part in the enforcement of federal immigration law.61
C. Traditional State Action and the Presumption Against Preemption
The Arizona and Alabama courts declined to apply a presumption
against preemption to the state laws in question without extensive
analysis.62 Relying on Wyeth v. Levine, the courts ruled that the identification of unlawfully present aliens is not “a field which the States
have traditionally occupied.”63 In so doing, the courts overlooked the
valid interest that state and local governments have in managing the
effects of immigration in their communities. Because the presumption against preemption is “rooted in the concept of federalism” and
61 As codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), IIRIRA states in relevant part,
(1) [T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State
. . . pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State . . . who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an
immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States . . . may carry out such function . . . to the
extent consistent with State and local law.
(2) An agreement under this subsection shall require that an officer or
employee of a State . . . performing a function under the agreement shall
have knowledge of, and adhere to, Federal law relating to the function, and
. . . the officers or employees performing the function . . . [must] have
received adequate training regarding the enforcement of relevant Federal
immigration laws.
(3) In performing a function under this subsection, an officer or employee
of a State . . . shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney
General . . . .
(10) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an agreement
under this subsection in order for any officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State—
(A) to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the United States; or
(B) otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present
in the United States.
IIRIRA also creates an obligation for the federal government to respond to inquiries
by “State [and] local government agenc[ies] . . . seeking to verify or ascertain the
citizenship or immigration status of any individual . . . for any purpose authorized by
law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2006).
62 See infra notes 103, 125 and accompanying text.
63 Id.
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the structural protection of state interests,64 the decision whether to
apply it requires a thorough examination of the breadth of state
police power and its operation in immigration law. Arizona v. United
States presents an opportunity to reevaluate the proper place for the
presumption in preemption analysis. This Note advocates applying
the presumption against preemption as it pertains to section 1357(g)
but relegates its function to the background in which Congress
legislates.
The “structure and limitations of federalism” afford states “great
latitude” in the exercise of their police powers.65 States are not altogether precluded from legislating on matters that have foreign policy
implications.66 Rather, where a state law is “designed to protect vital
state interests,” the court will presume that Congress did not intend to
preempt the law.67 In De Canas, California’s economic and security
interests were enough to bring an unauthorized immigrant employment law into the realm of state police power and secure the law a
presumption against preemption.68 Similarly, the purpose behind
S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56 was to protect Arizona and Alabama citizens
from the perceived threats posed by unauthorized aliens.69 The
“undeniable economic and social stake in immigration”70 possessed by
Arizona and Alabama should generally bring the laws within the operation of their historical police powers.71
The Arizona and Alabama courts drew a distinction between the
authority to arrest unauthorized aliens and the authority to investigate
and identify unauthorized aliens, and agree that identifying unauthorized aliens goes beyond traditional state police power.72 Congress
64 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
65 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (“[T]he structure and limitations of federalism . . .allow the States ‘great latitude under their police powers to
legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons.’ ”) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996)).
66 See Huntington, supra note 27, at 822 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
67 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976).
68 See Griffith, supra note 41, at 396.
69 See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
70 Huntington, supra note 27, at 817.
71 It may be argued that, prior to the exercise of federal immigration power, state
and local immigration regulation itself is rooted in the exercise of a historic state
power. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration
Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1729 (2010) (“For the American republic’s first
century, state and local immigration laws were almost the only source of immigration
regulation.”).
72 See infra notes 103, 125 and accompanying text.
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may favor such a distinction, but it is premature to separate the investigation of unauthorized aliens from general police powers when
determining the breadth of traditional state authority.73 As explored
at length by the Office of Legal Counsel, states possess an inherent
authority to enforce federal law subject to any federal law that
preempts them from doing so.74 The power to enforce law, vested in
traditional notions of police power, encompasses the power to investigate violations.75 Therefore, the Court should apply a presumption
against preemption in its implied preemption analysis.76
Assuming the presumption against preemption applies, the Court
is left with two related and strongly contested questions: (1) where
should the presumption fit into the Court’s analytical framework; and
(2) what weight should be given to the presumption that Congress did
not intend to subjugate traditional police power? This Section concludes the answers are early and with the weight normally afforded to
extratextual principles of interpretation.
The presumption against preemption has been applied at varying
stages of the Court’s analysis,77 but the presumption fits most naturally
73 Professor Kobach, in accordance with the Arizona and Alabama courts, argues
that there is a distinction between arrest authority—which falls within traditional state
power—and the authority to investigate violations. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69
ALB. L. REV. 179, 196 (2005). Kobach cites Congressional recognition “that the broad
[1357(g)] enforcement authority differed from the narrower inherent arrest authority already possessed by state and local law enforcement officers” to support this proposition. Id. at 196–97. Congress’s understanding of state authority, however, goes to
Congress’s intent in enacting section 1357(g)—rather than the actual scope of traditional state police power, governed by federalism principles—and therefore should
be considered in the later stages of preemption analysis.
74 OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NON-PREEMPTION OF THE
AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS TO ARREST ALIENS FOR
IMMIGRATION VIOLATIONS 4 (2005) (citing United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d
1298, 1301 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984)).
75 For a broad reading of state police power, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 566 (1995) (“The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police
power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation.”).
76 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
77 Compare Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1996) (“Although our
analysis of the scope of the pre-emption statute must begin with its text, our interpretation of that language does not occur in a contextual vacuum. Rather, that interpretation is informed by [the presumption against preemption].” (internal citation
omitted)), with Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67
(1989) (“The case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress has
indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and
has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension
there [is] between them.” (internal quotation omitted)).
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as the background in which Congress legislates.78 Applying the presumption at the end of the Court’s analysis, perhaps as a tie-breaker,
would improperly tip the balance in favor of state power;79 a substantive application of the presumption seems at odds with the Supremacy
Clause.80 Instead, considering the presumption as a background principle, the Court should “give the [federal] statute its natural meaning
and to let the chips fall where they may.”81 The presumption against
preemption should assist the Court’s analysis where the language of
the statute is ambiguous.82 Once the Court determines that a federal
statute intends to enter a sphere of traditional state power, “there is
no automatic reason to adopt a ‘narrow reading’ of the words that
Congress enacts.83 If the Court is unable to ascertain the intended
scope of the federal statute from the text, the presumption may come
into play as a principle of interpretation.
The presumption should be weighted as other extratextual interpretive tools, in part because of the substantive force of the
Supremacy Clause, and in part due to its inherent difficulty of application. The Court raised both these concerns in Garcia v. San Antonio
78 See Dinh, supra note 18, at 2106 (“The doctrine makes sense . . . if one considers the traditional assumption not as a dice-loading, ambiguity-resolving presumption,
but rather simply as the background in which Congress legislates and therefore
against which courts interpret the legislation . . . . The question is not whether Congress has the power; rather, the question is whether and to what extent Congress has
exercised that power.”).
79 See Weinberg, supra note 15, at 1797 (“To impose some additional choice-oflaw process on the ‘actual’ conflict case would be to raise a second presumption
against displacement of state law, and to sap the constitutional imperative of federal
supremacy.”).
80 See Nelson, supra note 14, at 241–42 (“A non obstante clause . . . acknowledge[s]
that [a] statute might contradict prior law and instruct[s] courts not to apply the
general presumption against [preemption].”).
81 Id. at 242.
82 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (“In the face of such ambiguity [as to whether Congress intended for federal law to cover state judges], we will not
attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state government functions . . . .”).
83 Nelson, supra note 14, at 301; see also Dinh, supra note 18, at 2092 (“[T]he task
for the Court is to discern what Congress has legislated and whether such legislation
displaces concurrent state law—in short, the task of statutory construction . . . . [A]s a
matter of constitutional structure, there should be no general systematic presumption
against or in favor of preemption.”). It follows that the more extensively Congress
legislates in a field, the more likely it is that Congress intended the full force of its
statutory language to take effect. See id. at 2106 (“[A]s Congress passes more and
more legislation in [an] area, what had initially seemed to be an extraordinary inferential leap becomes a rather natural step, simply because a Congressional decision to
displace state law is not as dramatic given its pervasive substantive regulations in the
area.”).
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Metropolitan Transit Authority, where it refused to limit federal power
based on traditional state functions.84 Further trivializing the weight
of the presumption, scholars have noted that the Court has displaced
state legislation in spheres of traditional state power even absent Congressional action.85 Thus, it would be improper to use the presumption against preemption as a per se solution for textual ambiguity;86
the Court, recognizing the limitations of the presumption, should use
it as an interpretive tool alongside other extratextual sources. Once
the Court has determined Congress’s intent, the presumption against
preemption should no longer play a role in preemption analysis.87
II.

THE BASES

OF THE

NINTH-ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SPLIT

A. The State Statutes at Issue
The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act
(S.B. 1070)88 and the Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (H.B. 56)89 are nearly identical in language, intent,
and effect. First and foremost, both laws require state and local law
enforcement officers to determine the immigration status of any
84 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985); see also id. at 549 (“Interference with the power of the
states was no constitutional criterion of the power of Congress.” (quoting JAMES
MADISON, 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1897 (1791))); id. at 544 (“[T]he only apparent virtue
of a rigorous historical standard, namely, its promise of a reasonably objective measure for state immunity, is illusory.”). But see Gregory, 501 U.S. at 462 (1991) (adopting
a plain statement rule where a federal statute intrudes on “an authority that lies at the
heart of representative government” (internal quotations omitted)). Dinh explains
the plain statement rule set forth in Gregory as “go[ing] to the structures of [state]
governance and thus implicat[ing] the Tenth Amendment’s protection of state sovereignty.” Dinh, supra note 18, at 2095. The Papers, Please provisions are probably not
central to Arizona’s or Alabama’s sovereign governance interest so they may be
afforded less than plain statement protection.
85 See Dinh, supra note 18, at 2098 (“[I]t is logically bankrupt to state . . . that the
touchstone of preemption analysis is Congressional intent and that there is a general
presumption against such intent, but then to recognize that state law can be displaced
without any relevant Congressional action—as in federal common law or dormant
Commerce Clause analysis.”).
86 Id. at 2116.
87 See Nelson, supra note 14, at 301. See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 545 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Though we generally ‘assum[e] that the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act[s]
unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress[ ]’ . . . [t]he ultimate
question in each case, as we have framed the inquiry, is one of Congress’s intent, as
revealed by the text, structure, purposes, and subject matter of the statutes involved.”
(internal citations omitted)).
88 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2010).
89 ALA. CODE § 31-13-12 (2011).
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stopped or arrested person they suspect may be in the country illegally.90 Second, both statutes determine immigration status based on
the federal immigration standards and impose a duty to report unauthorized aliens to federal authorities. Finally, both laws include antidiscrimination provisions that attempt to ameliorate the effects of the
statutes on minority groups.91
Both statutes are meant to curb the perceived problems caused
by unauthorized immigrants92 and the laws had similar effects on citizens and non-citizens living in each state. Thus, with nearly identical
language, intent, and effect, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits were left
to evaluate the constitutionality of each statute based solely on their
differing preemption analyses of the conflict between the state statutes and federal immigration law.
B. The Decisions
The Arizona and Alabama courts reached opposing legal conclusions regarding the preemptive effects of federal law on the Arizona
and Alabama Papers, Please statutes. The courts’ disagreement is
rooted in differing statutory constructions that led to opposing interpretations of Congress’s intent.
1.

United States v. Arizona

The Ninth Circuit reached two important conclusions that led to
its decision that Arizona’s Papers, Please law was preempted by federal
immigration law. First, the court held that the federal government
enacted a comprehensive regulatory scheme to govern immigration
enforcement, and as part of that scheme, state and local governments
90 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (“For any lawful stop, detention or
arrest made by a law enforcement official . . . of this state . . . where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States, a
reasonable attempt shall be made . . . to determine the immigration status of the
person . . . . Any person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status
determined before the person is released.”), with ALA. CODE § 31-13-12 (“Upon any
lawful stop, detention, or arrest made by a . . . law enforcement officer of this state . . .
where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present
in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made . . . to determine the citizenship and immigration status of the person . . . . Any alien who is arrested and booked
into custody shall have his or her immigration status determined . . . .”).
91 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (“A law enforcement official . . . of
this state . . . may not consider race, color or national origin in implementing the
requirements of this subsection . . . .”), with ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(c) (“A law enforcement officer may not consider race, color, or national origin in implementing the
requirements of this section . . . .”).
92 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-5\NDL515.txt

2012]

unknown

enforcement in kind

Seq: 17

2-AUG-12

11:27

2241

are only permitted to enforce immigration laws under the direction
and supervision of the federal government—not of their own
accord.93 Second, the court held that the federal immigration
scheme was designed to balance competing federal interests in its
implementation and enforcement.94 Taken together, these findings
dictated that the Arizona law was impliedly preempted by federal law
based on both obstacle and conflict preemption theories. The court
structured its opinion by examining the language and application of
the state statute in question before proceeding to relevant federal law
and finally engaging in preemption analysis. For the purpose of this
Note, I reordered the court’s analysis to reflect the preemption test set
forth in Part I.95
Based on the text of section 1357(g),96 the Arizona court determined that the statute’s scope encompasses the conditions under
which state officials are permitted to assist federal immigration
enforcement.97 The court recognized the textual conflict between
section 1357(g)(3) and section 1357(g)(10). Section 1357(g)(3) dictates, “In performing a function under this subsection, an officer . . .
of a State . . . shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the
Attorney General,”98 from which the court determined that “Congress
intended for states to be involved in the enforcement of immigration
laws under the Attorney General’s close supervision.”99
In contrast, section 1357(g)(10) states, “Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an agreement . . . in order for any
officer or employee of a State . . . to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of
93 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 350–51 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Congress contemplated state assistance in the identification of undocumented immigrants . . .
within the boundaries established [by federal law] . . . not in a manner dictated by a
state law that furthers a state immigration policy.”).
94 Id. at 352 (“Section 2(B)’s interference with Congressionally-granted Executive
discretion . . . ‘undermine[s] the President’s intended statutory authority’ to establish
immigration enforcement priorities and strategies.” (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377 (2000))).
95 See supra Part I.A. The court assumed that the federal government had the
constitutional authority to enact section 1357(g), or at least did not call its authority
into question, and without any reason to doubt the validity of this assumption, I will
begin with the federal statutory interpretation portion of the test.
96 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). See supra note 61 for the relevant text of section
1357(g) as it applies to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis.
97 Arizona, 641 F.3d at 348.
98 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3).
99 Arizona, 641 F.3d at 348.
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aliens not lawfully present in the United States.”100 Recognizing the
internal conflict presented by section 1357(g), the court relied on
“absurdity doctrine”-type analysis101 to give meaning to the statute.102
The court declined to apply a presumption that Congress intended to
limit its presence in the field, finding that “the states have not traditionally occupied the field of identifying immigration violations
. . . .”103 Returning to the statute, the court “interpret[ed] the meaning of [the] provisions as a whole, not . . . [section] 1357(g)(10) at the
expense of all others . . . .”104 The provisions of section 1357(g)
demonstrate that Congress “[intended] that systematic state immigration enforcement will occur under the direction and close supervision
of the Attorney General.”105
Proceeding to the state statute in question, S.B. 1070, the court
found that “on its face, the text . . . [of] Section 2(B) requires officers
to verify—with the federal government—the immigration status of all
arrestees before they are released . . . . ”106 Mandatory state participation in immigration enforcement, according to the court, was “foreclosed” by Congress’s explicit directives in section 1357(g), and
therefore mandatory participation stands as an obstacle to (and is preempted by) federal law.107 Furthermore, by interfering with “Congress’[s] delegation of discretion to the Executive branch in enforcing
[federal immigration law],” the Arizona law conflicts with Congress’s
intent because it imposes a mandatory enforcement mechanism on
local and state officials.108
The court supported its intent analysis by looking to other purposes and objectives embodied in federal immigration policy. According to the court, Congress recognizes that “flexibility is a critical
component” of the statutory and regulatory framework of federal
immigration law, which allows the executive branch to balance the
“goals of protecting national security, protecting public safety, and
100 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10).
101 See Dinh, supra note 18, at 2116.
102 Arizona, 641 F.3d at 349 (“Although this language, read alone, is broad, we
must interpret Congress’[s] intent . . . in light of the rest of § 1357(g). Giving subsection (g)(10) the breadth of its isolated meaning would completely nullify the rest of
§ 1357(g) . . . .”).
103 Id. (relying on the standard set forth in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565
(2009)).
104 Id. at 351.
105 Id. at 352.
106 Id. at 347 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010)).
107 Id. at 349.
108 Id. at 352.
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securing the border.”109 The execution of immigration law also has
far-reaching domestic and foreign policy implications, which the court
held were jeopardized by the Arizona statute.110 The court concluded
that Arizona’s Papers, Please law was inconsistent with both the purpose and operation of federal immigration law and was therefore preempted by federal law based on obstacle and conflict preemption
analysis.111
2.

United States v. Alabama 112

The Eleventh Circuit was presented with a nearly identical state
statute as the Ninth Circuit but held the statute not preempted by
federal law.113 In an order upholding United States v. Alabama, the
court allowed Alabama’s Papers, Please law to go into effect.114 The
opinion relied on two conclusions central to the district court’s reasoning. First, the text of section 1357(g) does not expressly preempt
the Alabama statute, but rather allows for cooperation between the
Department of Homeland Security and state and local law enforcement officers.115 Second, the Alabama statute is consistent with the
purpose of Congress—“to provide an important role for state officers
in the enforcement of immigration laws”116 —and does not conflict
109 Id. (quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349
(2001)).
110 The court noted that the law “has had a deleterious effect on the United
States’ foreign relations,” citing the negative response from various foreign heads of
state. Id. at 352. The court also feared that “50 states layering their own immigration
enforcement rules on top of the INA” would increase the burdens of federal enforcement in the United States. Id. at 354.
111 It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit based the need for central oversight and discretion on the federal government’s ability to “most efficiently . . .
advance the goals” of “safety and security” and account for the foreign policy implications of increased immigration enforcement. Id.at 351–52. As set forth in Part III,
infra, these interests are insufficient to justify vesting discretion in the federal
government.
112 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011). The Eleventh Circuit upheld the
district court’s decision regarding the constitutionality of the Alabama’s Papers,
Please provision without discussion of the issue before the court, intending to leave
further analysis to a merits panel that would hear the case. United States v. Alabama,
443 Fed. App’x 411 (11th Cir. 2011). For this reason, this section will analyze the
district court’s opinion with the assumption that the circuit court adopted its
reasoning in upholding the district court’s order.
113 See supra Part I.A.
114 Alabama, 443 Fed. App’x at 411.
115 Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
116 Id. at 1326 (quoting United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 376 (9th Cir. 2011)
(Bea, J., dissenting)).
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with broader national policy objectives.117 Based on these findings,
the court held that federal law neither expressly nor impliedly preempted the Alabama law.118
Like the Arizona court, the Alabama court did not raise constitutional questions as to the validity of section 1357(g).119 Moving to the
statute’s text, section 1357(g) indicates that state and local law
enforcement may “cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully
present in the United States.”120 The court determined that the
scope of 1357(g) covers the conduct in question, i.e., subfederal participation in the identification, apprehension, detention, and removal
of illegal aliens.121 The core issue for the court was how Congress
intended the law to be carried out.
As important as the affirmative duties vested in the Executive, the
language of this section indicates an “inherent authority to assist in
the enforcement of federal immigration law . . . .”122 Thus, while Congress did not intend to create state enforcement authority independent of Executive authorization, Congress also did not foreclose
subfederal assistance in its entirety. First, state and local officials are
free to communicate with the federal government regarding the
immigration status of an individual and the federal government is
required to respond.123 Second, by the plain language of section
1357(g), no formal agreement is necessary for states “otherwise to
cooperate” with the federal government.124 The court declined to
apply a presumption against preemption upon reaching textual
ambiguity.125
The next piece of the court’s analysis involved the language and
effect of H.B. 56. Noting the similarities between S.B. 1070 and H.B.
117 Id. at 1312, 1328.
118 Id. at 1323.
119 Id. at 1294.
120 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) (2006). The court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s argument that the language in section 1357(g)—dictating that the Attorney General
“may” deputize state officers—indicates the only way in which state officers may take
part in the enforcement of federal immigration law. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at
1294.
121 Id. at 1329.
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g), 1373(c) (2006)).
124 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B)).
125 Id. at 1321 (“Section 12 reaches beyond arrest protocols into the field of identification of unlawfully present aliens. Identifying unlawfully present aliens is not a
field which the States have traditionally occupied.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 599 U.S. 555, 585 (2009))).
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56, the court relied largely on the statutory interpretation put forth by
the dissenting opinion in United States v. Arizona.126 The Alabama law,
like section 1357(g), governs subfederal immigration enforcement
and reflects a broader “intent to cooperate with the federal
government.”127
Based on these analyses, the court established that the Alabama
provision fits within the space the federal government left for enforcement cooperation and is therefore not preempted. The court found
the Alabama statute consistent with the purpose of the INA, and thus
not standing as an obstacle to federal immigration enforcement.
According to the court, the purpose of sections 1357(g) and 1373(c)
is to facilitate federal immigration enforcement by enlisting state and
local officers.128 Relying again on Judge Bea’s dissenting opinion in
Arizona, the court cited the “important roles for state and local officials to play” in the enforcement of federal laws.129 The court concluded that these provisions reveal Congress’s intent that states play
an active role in enforcing federal immigration law, and therefore
their doing so is consistent with the purpose of federal law.
The court also held that the Alabama law does not stand as an
obstacle to broader federal policy objectives.130 Congress allows Executive discretion in federal immigration enforcement in that the federal government does not have to act on the information that
Alabama state and local officials are required by state law to submit.131
Likewise, Alabama will only transfer detained immigrants to the federal government’s custody at the federal government’s request, so the
law will not unduly burden federal enforcement resources beyond the
extent authorized by the federal government.132 According to the
court, the Alabama law also protects individual rights, in keeping with
federal policy, through its anti-discrimination provision and reliance
on federal immigration standards.133 Finally, the court held that the
126 Id. at 1327.
127 Id. at 1328. The court notes that the Alabama law goes so far as to rely on
federal law in its enforcement. Id. (“[A]ll final determinations as to immigration status are made by the federal government, unlawful presence is defined by federal law,
and state law enforcement will only transfer illegal aliens to the federal government’s
custody at the federal government’s request.” (internal citations omitted)).
128 See id. at 1324 (“Congress has clearly expressed its intention that state officials
should assist federal officials in checking the immigration status of aliens.” (quoting
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 372 (9th Cir. 2011) (Bea, J., dissenting))).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1334.
131 Id. at 1321.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1338.
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United States submitted insufficient evidence to show that the Alabama law threatens foreign policy goals.134 Because the Papers, Please
provision did not conflict with the purpose of federal immigration law
and did not stand as an obstacle to federal immigration enforcement,
the court held that federal law does not impliedly preempt the Papers,
Please provision.
III. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The heart of the courts’ disagreement is the nature of the relationship between federal and state law enforcement agencies that
Congress intended to create for enforcing federal immigration law.
The Arizona court found that Congress intended a top-down relationship, whereby the federal government would dictate the terms of
cooperation between the state and federal enforcement agencies.135
In contrast, the Alabama court held that Congress intended to create
an enforcement scheme whereby state actors may pursue immigration
violations on their own accord so long as they cooperate with the federal government by relaying status inquiries through federal agencies.136 This Part opens by determining the intended scope and
application of section 1357(g), governing the “[p]erformance of
immigration officer functions by State officers and employees,”137 and
concludes by analyzing the preemptive effect of section 1357(g) on
the state statute before the Court.
A. Congressional Intent
Congressional intent is the “touchstone” of implied preemption
analysis.138 As such, this Section uses the principles set forth in Part I
to discern the intent behind federal immigration statutes that govern
subfederal immigration enforcement. This Section begins with the
language of section 1357(g) and relies on extratextual indications of
Congressional intent as needed.139 The key issue before the Court is
134 Id. at 1328. The court rejected evidence of foreign disapproval and statements
by U.S. officials because “the power to preempt lies with Congress, not with the Executive.” Id. (“It is Congress—not the [Executive]—that has the power to pre-empt
otherwise valid state laws . . . .” (citing North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423,
442 (1990))).
135 See supra Part II.B.1.
136 See supra Part II.B.2.
137 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
138 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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what Congress meant by “cooperate” in section 1357(g)’s savings
clause.
Beginning with the text, section 1357(g)(1) states that the federal
government may enter into a written agreement with a State “pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State . . . who is . . . qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer . . . may carry out
such function . . . .”140 The federal government may give state officers
“immigration officer” powers, including command of “the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens.”141 Read in isolation, section 1357(g)(1) indicates that Congress intended for state officers to
derive their immigration authority from the federal government and
are permitted to act within the provisions of these agreements. Section 1357(g)(3) supports Arizona’s top-down enforcement interpretation, stating that “[i]n performing a function under this subsection,”
state and local officers are subject to the “direction and supervision”
of the federal government.142
Section 1357(g)’s savings clause, central to the courts’ disagreement, allows subfederal law enforcement to “communicate with the
[federal government] regarding immigration status . . . or otherwise to
cooperate with the [federal government] in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens” absent a written agreement.143 The Arizona court limited the breadth of this provision
because it believed that applying a natural reading would eviscerate
140 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).
141 Id.
142 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). The location of this provision may indicate that Congress intended its constraint to apply only to the provisions above it in the subsection,
in which case it would have no bearing on state action pursuant to section
1357(g)(10). However, the language of section 1357(g)(3) refers to the performance
of functions under section 1357(g)—not only to state and local officers acting pursuant to a written agreement with the federal government. In contrast, 1357(g)(2)
specifies “an agreement under this subsection shall require . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)
(emphasis added).
143 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) reads in full:
(10) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an agreement under this
subsection in order for any officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a
State—
(A) to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of
any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully
present in the United States; or
(B) otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-5\NDL515.txt

2248

unknown

Seq: 24

notre dame law review

2-AUG-12

11:27

[vol. 87:5

the entire section.144 In contrast, the Alabama court read this provision to indicate Congressional understanding that state and local
power to enforce immigration law is not predicated on an agreement
with the federal government.145 By this reading, section 1357(g)(10)
empowers state and local governments to dictate the terms of their
officers’ cooperation with the federal government so long as they
communicate to verify immigration status.146 Alabama’s “verificationas-cooperation” would allow subfederal actors, among other things, to
remove unlawful aliens from the United States so long as they cooperate (verify) status with the federal government. Vesting such a power
in the states could undermine the existing federal enforcement
structure.
By preserving federal oversight, the Court may give the savings
clause its full and natural reading while maintaining a functional
immigration system. Rather than working against the rest of section
1357(g), the savings clause ensures that Congress does not handcuff
federal enforcement agencies by preventing them from enlisting local
assistance as needed. Irrespective of agreement, state officials may
cooperate in immigration enforcement to the extent dictated by federal agencies on a case-by-case basis as their services are needed. In
light of the provision as a whole, the presence or absence of an agreement only determines the freedom afforded to state officials. With an
agreement, state and local officials may act as full-fledged immigration
officers. Absent agreement, state and local actors may provide assistance the federal government, whether through manpower or detainment facilities, without subjecting these procedures to legal challenge.
The savings clause does not change the nature of the federal-state
144 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 351 (2011) (“[O]ur task is to interpret
the meaning of many INA provisions as a whole, not . . . [section] 1357(g)(10) at the
expense of all others . . . .”).
145 See supra Part II.B.2.
146 While this seems to be a stark outcome, the “removal of aliens” is among the
enumerated powers in the savings clause. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) (2006); United
States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (“H.B. 56 . . . reflects an
intent to cooperate with the federal government, in that all final determinations as to
immigration status are made by the federal government, . . . unlawful presence is
defined by federal law, . . . and state law enforcement will only transfer illegal aliens to
the federal government’s custody at the federal government’s request.” (citations
omitted)). By this interpretation, if a an illegal immigrant is identified by a state
officer and his or her status is determined by federal law enforcement, the state may
unilaterally remove that immigrant so long as they do not force his or her transfer
upon the federal government. This is compatible with Congress’s interest in not overburdening federal holding centers, but such a broad power is unsupported by any
extratextual indicators of Congressional intent.
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relationship; in both cases the federal government retains a supervisory role.
The existence of a circuit split indicates that there may be sufficient textual ambiguity to look outside the text of section 1357(g) for
Congress’s intent.147 As set forth in Part I, the Court should apply the
presumption that Congress legislated in the background of state
police powers.148 The presumption should not take the Court far,
however, as the text of 1357(g) explicitly places federal actors in the
sphere of immigration enforcement, thereby overcoming the presumption that Congress did not intend to encroach upon a sphere of
state sovereignty.149
Turning to section 1357(g)’s legislative history with hesitance,150
it seems that the Alabama court properly took the last provision of the
subsection into account but adopted a reading at odds with Congress’s intent. On its surface, section 1357(g)’s legislative history indicates that it was added to the INA in order to “empower State and
local law enforcement agencies with the ability to actively fight the
problem of illegal immigration.”151 Behind the purpose of this
amendment was the general consensus that, prior to its enactment,
state and local law enforcement had no power in the field of immigration enforcement.152 This point was largely overlooked by both
147 See Nelson, supra note 14, at 284 (“Because everyone agrees that some type of
context or purpose is relevant to interpreting a federal statute’s words, and because
the meaning of those words determines the statute’s preemptive scope, it follows that
everyone sees a role for the consideration of some type of context or purpose in
preemption cases.”).
148 Supra Part I.C.
149 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
150 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[T]he Court[’s] routine[ly] invalidat[es] state laws based on perceived conflicts
with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of Congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law.”).
151 Hearing on H.R. 2202, supra note 2, at H2479; see also id. (“[T]his amendment
would allow the State and local government officials to apprehend and detain illegal
aliens who are caught violating deportation orders.” (statement of Rep. Salmon)); id.
(“We are talking about . . . allowing the local community to contribute to the Federal
[immigration enforcement] effort.” (statement of Rep. Bilbray)); id. at 2477 (“The
amendment . . . will give [local law enforcement] the tools they need to deal with
[illegal immigration].” (statement of Rep. Doolittle)).
152 This belief was held by the amendment’s supporters and opponents. See, e.g.,
id. at H2476 (“Local law enforcement agencies are understandably frustrated by [the
problem of illegal immigration] because there is legally nothing that a State or local
law enforcement agency can do about a violation of immigration law other than calling the [federal government].”); id. at H2477 (“You do not find the California Highway Patrol . . . trying to enforce national immigration law . . . because those are
separate and distinct activities . . . . But to now break those clear lines of division
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courts, but if taken at face value, may be a critical component of Congress’s intended scope. If Congress believed subfederal actors were
powerless outside an affirmative grant then it would seem illogical to
conclude that they intended section 1357(g)(10) to reserve preexisting state immigration authority. The states, according to the
law’s sponsor, were powerless to act on immigration enforcement
outside of “calling the local INS officer to report the case.”153 Thus,
in terms of scope, section 1357(g)’s legislative history indicates that
the entire authority Congress intended to grant state officers in immigration enforcement is derived from the statute.
The debate surrounding the enactment of section 1357(g) gives
several clues as to Congress’s intended scope, i.e., the way Congress
intended to empower state and local governments in immigration
enforcement. First, section 1357(g)’s sponsor envisioned a prominent
role for the Justice Department in dictating the rights and authorities
of state and local law enforcement.154 Representative Latham’s statements accord with the Arizona court’s “supervisory role” interpretation
of Congressional intent.155 Most importantly, these statements indicate that the states are powerless to take on an investigatory role in
immigration enforcement absent express agreement with the federal
government.156
A secondary purpose may be discerned from the text (and perhaps the legislative history) of section 1373(g). Section 1357(g)(3),
along with supplementary immigration statutes,157 indicates a concern
for unfettered subfederal enforcement.158 If Congress’s sole intention was to maximize immigration enforcement, presumably Congress
would have given any willing participants free reign in this arena.
Instead, section 1357(g)(2) requires that subfederal law enforcement
receive adequate training before taking part in immigration enforcewould have us allow a local law enforcement officer to do the work of a Federal law
enforcement officer.” (statement of Rep. Becerra)).
153 Id. at H2476 (statement of Rep. Latham).
154 Id. (“My amendment will allow State and local law enforcement agencies to
enter into voluntary agreements with the Justice Department to give them the authority
to seek, to apprehend, and detain those illegal aliens who are subject to an order of
deportation.” (emphasis added)).
155 See id. at H2477–79; supra note 151 and accompanying text.
156 Hearing on H.R. 2202, supra note 2, at H2477–79.
157 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
158 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3) (2006) (subjecting state and local officers to the “direction and supervision” of the federal government “in performing a function under this
subsection”).
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ment.159 The legislative history details an extensive debate regarding
the potential problem of unqualified and over-zealous state and local
law enforcement officers. The opposition to section 1373(g) believed
that because of the sensitive nature of immigration enforcement, state
and local law enforcement would be unable to take on federal responsibilities while respecting the rights of individuals.160
The question remains whether the statute reflects its legislative
history; the text must support the purpose and intent of the members
who crafted the bill.161 The text seems to do so, so the Court may
choose to use the legislative history to shed some light on Congress’s
intended scope and application. The text and history, in isolation and
conjunction, indicate that Congress’s primary purpose was to
strengthen federal immigration enforcement subject to federal direction and supervision. In so doing, Congress intended to create a topdown enforcement mechanism that vests ultimate authority and discretion in the federal government.
B. State Interference with Federal Law
After ascertaining the intended scope and application of section
1357(g), the Court should next evaluate whether S.B. 1070 and H.B.
56 come into conflict with federal law. This Part proceeds by applying
the field and conflict preemption analyses set forth in Part I.162
159 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2) (“An agreement under this subsection shall require that
an officer or employee of a State . . . performing a function under the agreement
shall have knowledge of, and adhere to, Federal law relating to the function, and . . .
the officers or employees performing the function . . . [must] have received adequate
training regarding the enforcement of relevant Federal immigration laws.”).
160 See Hearing on H.R. 2202, supra note 2, at H2477 (“I believe [this law] will lead
to situations where we have people who are not trained to do the work doing the work
beyond their capacity as local law enforcement trying to do Federal enforcement
activities . . . which has in the past caused harm, injury, and discrimination against
certain classes of individuals.” (statement of Rep. Becerra)); id. at H2478 (“[I]n the
past there have been occasions when some very aggressive, zealous local law enforcement officials have actually detained people because of their foreign-looking appearance or because of their racial or ethnic appearance.”); id. (“I think we are [ ]
endangering our ethnic and minority communities . . . .” (statement of Rep. JacksonLee)).
161 See Nelson, supra note 14, at 285–86 (“[E]ven if courts can learn exactly how
far members of the enacting Congress would have liked to carry the purposes behind
a particular statute, courts still must ask whether the statute reflects that decision
. . . .”).
162 Papers, Please provisions are not expressly preempted by federal law. Congress
has proposed legislation that would expressly limit the authority to investigate immigration violations to immigration officers and the federal government, but as of this
writing, the legislation is stalled in the Senate. See S. 1258, 112th Cong. § 224 (2011).
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C. Implied Preemption
1. Field Preemption
Congress has not legislated so extensively in the field of immigration law enforcement as to preclude state participation in the area.
Rather, Congress has expressly provided for a state role in immigration enforcement by allowing states and localities to enter into
enforcement agreements with the federal government.163 State and
local law enforcement are authorized to arrest and detain certain
unauthorized aliens,164 and section 1357(g)’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended a role for states in federal immigration
enforcement.165 Thus, based on the text of 1357(g), Congress did not
intend to occupy the entire field of immigration enforcement.
The perceived distinction between selection and regulation in
immigration law should play a role in field preemption analysis. Congress has preempted state law that selects residents based on citizenSection 287(g) (8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)) is amended by striking paragraph (10)
and inserting the following:
(10) [T]he authority to investigate, identify, apprehend, arrest, or detain
persons for any violation of this Act or any regulation issued pursuant to this
Act—
(A) is restricted to immigration officers and employees of the Department of Homeland Security; and
(B) is subject to the specific limitations set forth in this Act.
Id. Though Executive agencies have denounced S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56, only Congress may preempt state law. See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 442
(1990) (“It is Congress—not the [Executive Branch]—that has the power to pre-empt
otherwise valid state laws.”). Thus, the Court’s express preemption analysis should be
fairly straight forward and will not be examined in this Note.
163 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (“[T]he Attorney General may enter into a written
agreement with a State . . . pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State . . .
who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of
an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of
aliens in the United States . . . may carry out such function . . . .”).
164 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (2006) (“State and local law enforcement officials are
authorized to arrest and detain an individual who—(1) is an alien illegally present in
the United States; and (2) has previously been confided of a felony in the United
States and deported or left the United States after such conviction . . . after the State
or local law enforcement officials obtain appropriate confirmation from the [federal
government] of the status of such individual . . . .”).
165 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2202, supra note 2 at H2477 (“I offer this amendment
today to empower State and local law enforcement agencies with the ability to actively
fight the problem of illegal immigration.” (statement of Rep. Latham)).
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ship status,166 while states have been allowed to regulate the lives of
immigrants living within their borders.167 So long as the Court recognizes this distinction, state laws that regulate the lives of immigrants
will probably withstand field preemption scrutiny. However, as state
and local immigration laws continue to ratchet up the pressure on
immigrants living within their borders, this distinction will probably
exist only in theory. As Professor Cox points out, every law that regulates the lives of immigrants has the effect of applying selection pressure.168 State regulations have the potential to affect broader
immigration patterns by discouraging immigration to the United
States entirely and therefore may encroach upon the field of federal
immigration practice.169
As it stands, however, states are not altogether preempted from
policing the lives of immigrants as S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56 seek to do. A
legally analogous case was presented to the Supreme Court in De
Canas v. Bicas.170 Prior to the enactment of section 1324a,171 the
Court analyzed a state statute that criminalized the employment of
unauthorized aliens.172 The Court held that “scope and detail of the
INA” did not foreclose the possibility of state immigration legislation
without clear Congressional intent to preempt state law.173 Thus,
despite the presence of a “comprehensive federal statutory scheme for
regulation of immigration and naturalization,” field preemption did
not invalidate state attempts to regulate the lives of unauthorized
immigrants.174
While it may be argued that checking immigration status does not
fall under the umbrella of historic state police power, and therefore
state statutes that impose such a duty should not be afforded the same
166 Though the Constitution does not grant exclusive immigration selection
authority to the federal government, it is widely presumed that Congress wields broad
power in this sphere. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 44.
168 Supra note 43.
169 See Huntington, supra note 27, at 798 (“[A]lienage laws barring non-citizens
from certain public benefits likely affect immigration by discouraging some non-citizens from coming to the United States and encouraging others to leave.”).
170 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
171 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006) (governing the unlawful employment of aliens).
172 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (repealed by Stats. 1988, c. 946, § 1).
173 De Canas, 424 U.S. at 359 (“[T]he Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se
pre-empted by [federal immigration] power, whether latent or exercised.”).
174 Id. at 355. It should be noted that the Court considered the regulation of
employment among the states’ historic police powers, and therefore did not presume
that Congress intended to preempt immigration employment laws. Id. at 357.
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latitude as employment regulations, this distinction fits more appropriately in conflict preemption analysis. The important takeaway from
De Canas is that Congress has not legislated so extensively in the field
of immigration law as to foreclose state action that touches upon the
subject. As such, S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56 are constitutional based on
field preemption.
2. Conflict Preemption
a. Impossibility of Dual Compliance
Federal law preempts state statutes where dual compliance is
impossible.175 While impossibility preemption sets forth a difficult
standard,176 S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56 are incompatible with federal law
because they vest affirmative duties in state and local law officers that
section 1357(g) prohibits.177
For a brief recapitulation of S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56, state and local
officers must determine the immigration status of any individual who
draws reasonable suspicion of unauthorized presence during a routine stop or detention.178 The subjective suspicion requirement is
dropped upon arrest, after which every detainee’s immigration status
must be determined prior to release.179 The Alabama court found this
requirement compatible with federal law, noting that sections 1373(c)
and 1357(g)(10) create an obligation for the federal government to
respond to immigration inquiries and do not limit the number of
175 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (“A
holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into
congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility . . . .”).
176 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009) (“Impossibility pre-emption is a
demanding defense.”); see also Nelson, supra note 14, at 288 n.15 (“The ‘physical
impossibility’ test applies so rarely that even Florida Lime—the case consistently cited
as authority for it—mentioned the test only in dicta.”).
177 Professor Nelson notes that the physical impossibility component of implied
preemption will not be met where “one sovereign’s law purports to give people a right
to engage in conduct that the other sovereign’s law purports to prohibit,” because a
person could comply with both laws by refraining from that conduct. Nelson, supra
note 14, at 288 n.15. This affirmative requirement created by S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56—
that officers engage in conduct that violates federal law—distinguishes this case from
those presented to the Court in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S.
25 (1996), and Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n v. Agriculture Marketing and Bargaining
Board, 467 U.S. 461 (1984), where compliance with both the state and federal law at
issue could be attained by inaction. Rather, this case is more analogous to Stewart Org.
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) for reasons set forth below.
178 See supra note 90.
179 Id.
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inquiries a state or local agency may make.180 This interpretation of
S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56, however, mischaracterizes the duty placed on
state and local officers. The state laws plainly require state and local
officers not only to communicate immigration status with federal
agencies, but also to identify and detain unauthorized aliens.181
This requirement is irreconcilable with the scope and application
section 1357(g), which requires either a written agreement or cooperation with the federal government to identify or detain unlawful
aliens.182 The issue of opposing directives was presented to the Court
in Stewart Organization Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.183 In that case, the federal
statute in question vested discretion for venue transfers in the district
court based on flexible and individualized analyses.184 In contrast,
Alabama law allowed judges to refuse transfer requests.185 Though at
times a court would refuse transfer in compliance with both laws, the
court held that the “federal law’s ‘discretionary mode of operation’
conflicts with the nondiscretionary provision of [state] law.”186
Professor Nelson provides a similar approach to conflict preemption, which he refers to as the “logical-contradiction” test. Preemption does not require “physical impossibility”; rather, if “state law
purports to authorize something that federal law forbids . . . the
Supremacy Clause requires [courts] to apply the federal rule.”187 Justice Thomas has also criticized the “physical impossibility” test in favor
of a formulation of the “logical-contradiction” test.188 Thomas recognized “[t]here could be instances where it is not ‘physically impossible’ to comply with both state and federal law, even when state and
federal law give directly conflicting commands.”189 With regard to the
issue at hand, the Papers, Please provisions give subfederal law enforcers a right which may only be vested at the discretion of the federal
government. Beyond “logical-contradiction,” in the absence of an
180 United States v. Alabama, 813 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1320–21 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
181 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
182 See supra Part III.A.
183 487 U.S. 22.
184 Id. at 22.
185 Id. at 30.
186 Id. (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987)). The
Court noted even “potential conflict in fact frames an additional argument for the
supremacy of federal law.” Id. at 31.
187 Nelson, supra note 14, at 261.
188 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 590 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“ ‘[P]hysical impossibility’ may not be the most appropriate standard for determining
whether the text of the state and federal laws directly conflict.” (citing Nelson, supra
note 14, at 260–61)).
189 Id. (citing Nelson, supra note 14, at 260–61).
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agreement with the federal government, it is impossible for a local
officer in Alabama to comply with the requirements of H.B. 56 during
a routine stop or detention without violating federal law. Because of
the conflicting applications of state and federal law, the state law must
be preempted.
b. Obstacle to the Attainment of a Federal Purpose or Goal
Federal law preempts state law where the state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”190 As set forth in Part III.A, Congress’s
purpose and objective in enacting section 1357(g) was to strengthen
and enhance immigration enforcement by empowering state and
local governments to act pursuant to federal direction. The first
aspect of Congress’s purpose, to strengthen and enhance immigration
enforcement, is unlikely to suffer from unfettered state and local
action.191 For this reason, this Section focuses on the second aspect of
Congress’s purpose—maintaining federal oversight and discretion in
immigration enforcement.192
Proponents of greater subfederal autonomy in immigration
enforcement point to the Court’s reasoning in Hines v. Davidowitz,
which states, “states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law
. . . .”193 This language opens the possibility that state and local laws
may supplement federal law insofar as they advance the purpose of
Congress. The Arizona and Alabama legislatures shared Congress’s
primary goal and went so far as to include safeguards against discriminatory enforcement.194 Furthermore, Congress expressly allows for
state participation, albeit in cooperation with the federal government,
in the “identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens
190 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
191 Rather, if Congress wanted to maximize the breadth of immigration enforcement and crack down on the perceived threat posed by unauthorized aliens, this purpose would likely be best served by offering state and local governments full
autonomy in the field.
192 For a strong critique of the “purposes and objectives” test, see Justice Thomas’s
dissent in Wyeth v. Levine. 555 U.S. at 583 (“I have become increasingly skeptical of
this Court’s ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence. Under this
approach, the Court routinely invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with
broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of Congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law.”).
193 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added).
194 See supra note 91.
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not lawfully present in the United States.”195 While at odds with the
procedure Congress intended to create for state participation, subfederal involvement in immigration enforcement may further Congress’s substantive goals of strengthening enforcement while
protecting civil rights.
Sharing a goal with the federal government, however, does not
save a state or local law that interferes with Congress’s chosen means
of application.196 By setting forth strict procedures for state and local
involvement, Congress intended to vest discretion in federal agencies
over immigration enforcement.197 The federal government is better
suited than state and local actors to balance competing interests and
account for the interstate effects of immigration enforcement.198
Thus, to accomplish the “full purposes and objectives of Congress,”199
the federal government must maintain supervisory authority over state
and local officers.
While Congress does not need to justify setting forth a mechanism for the application of federal law,200 obstacle preemption analy195 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (2006).
196 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379 (2000) (“The
conflicts are not rendered irrelevant by the States’ argument that there is no real
conflict between the statutes because they share the same goals and because some
companies may comply with both sets of restrictions . . . . The fact of a common end
hardly neutralizes conflicting means . . . .” (internal quotation and citations
omitted)).
197 See, e.g., supra Part III.A.
198 See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 71, at 1744–45 (“[P]reemption of state and
local laws affecting immigrants reflects a reliance on the political process, especially
on transparency and deliberation in a larger federal policy arena with a more complex array of counterweights than would shape state or local decisionmaking. With
regard to unauthorized migrants, if laws and policies must be enacted nationally, then
many that raise constitutional concerns—such as racial or ethnic discrimination—
might never be adopted.” (footnote omitted)); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 493, 528 (2001) (“[T]he federal government is empowered to regulate immigration because immigration lawmaking can implicate foreign policy and national security concerns; thus, when the federal government exercises its immigration power,
foreign affairs considerations, to some extent, may be balanced with equality principles in assessing the justification for that regulation.” (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952) (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.” (footnote omitted)))).
199 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
200 See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 18, at 2092; Weinberg, supra note 165, at 1756
(rejecting interest analysis for the resolution of state-federal conflicts).
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sis often rests on extratextual justification.201 Federal discretion
necessarily encompasses both the decision whether to exert immigration power and to what extent.202 The federal government has a
strong interest in balancing the civil rights implications of state immigration action when dictating the manner and extent of enforcement.203 S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56 “incrementally diminish[ ]”204 the
federal government’s control over immigration enforcement and its
ability ensure that enforcement is carried out in accordance with its
civil rights policy. Congress believed that federal oversight was the
best means to achieve nondiscriminatory immigration enforcement,
so S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56 will not be saved by their anti-discrimination
provisions.205 Federal law preempts S.B. 1070 and H.B. 56 because
they stand as an obstacle to Congress’s intended application of section
1357(g) and the attainment of Congress’s secondary purpose.
CONCLUSION
Arizona v. United States provides the Court with an opportunity to
disentangle competing preemption doctrines and set forth a compre201 For a critique of the Court’s traditional formulation of obstacle preemption,
see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
202 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037,
2063–64 (2008) (“[F]ederal immigration law is a matter of inaction as much as affirmative decision-making. . . . It is crucial not only who picks enforcement targets, but
also who allocates resources, and who balances enforcement against competing concerns like inappropriate reliance on race or ethnicity.”).
203 Scholars contest the proposition that uniform immigration policy will better
serve the interests of unauthorized immigrants than contrasting subfederal laws. See,
e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567, 639 (2008) (“[P]reempting local laws that aim to exclude immigrants will not make for a better integration environment, because the sentiments
behind the preempted ordinances are likely to remain and fester.”); Peter J. Spiro,
Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997)
(“State-level modulation in immigration policy . . . will more efficiently represent
wide state-to-state variations in voter preferences . . . that may ultimately benefit aliens
as a group.”). Indeed, some states have passed laws that increase state benefits to
unauthorized aliens. See Huntington, supra note 27, at 803 (“[S]ome states and localities have enacted laws that benefit non-citizens, including unauthorized migrants.”).
Furthermore, state laws touching on immigration issues receive more judicial scrutiny
for discriminatory effect than federal laws. Id. at 797, 891. Regardless of net impact,
however, Congress was concerned with particular incidents of discrimination. Congress’s intent—that state and local enforcement power does not foster discrimination—should guide the Court’s preemption analysis. See supra, note 160.
204 Wisc. Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282,
288 (1986).
205 See supra note 160.

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-5\NDL515.txt

2012]

unknown

enforcement in kind

Seq: 35

2-AUG-12

11:27

2259

hensive framework for federal-state conflict analysis. The framework
set forth in this Note advocates that the Court proceeds through each
issue as follows: (1) whether Congress has the constitutional authority
to enact the federal law in question; (2) what is the intended scope
and operation of the federal law in question; (3) what is the actual
scope and operation of the state law in question; and (4) whether that
state law conflicts with Congress’s intended application of federal law.
As applied to Arizona v. United States, Congress intended to
strengthen immigration enforcement by empowering subfederal
officers to take part in the investigation, apprehension, and detention
of unauthorized aliens. In the application of that power, Congress
intended to create a top-down immigration enforcement mechanism
that vested a supervisory interest in the federal government. The Arizona Papers, Please provision conflicts with Congress’s intent because
it creates a mandatory enforcement scheme that subverts federal oversight and interferes with the scope and operation of federal immigration law. Federal law therefore preempts the Papers, Please
provisions.
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